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∂AIL Professor Nicholas Rescher↓Department of Philosophy
↓University of Pittsburgh↓Pittsburgh, PA∞

Dear Professor Rescher:

	You may be interested in the enclosed paper.  What makes me
think so is your paper in the volume of essays honoring Hempel.
In that paper you argue that certain concepts cannot be defined
without assuming minds.  I think the considerations you advance
are important but admit a different interpretation - namely that
certain concepts are not definable in themselves but only as part
of a theory.  A theory is a complex mathematical structure, and
one might be inclined to argue that such theories presuppose minds,
but the argument would have no more force than an argument that
any mathematical concepts presuppose minds.  It further turns
out that the theories are often only approximate, and a concept
defined in terms of a theory may not be defined in a better
approximation to reality.  I argue that many counterfactual
statements have that character which makes them seem to vanish
when examined too closely.

	Please excuse any evidence of inexperience with philosophy.
I find myself driven to think about these questions by the
requirements of research in artificial intelligence.  Any comments
will be appreciated.

.sgn